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PREFACE 
The  foLecasts  presented  in  this  document  have  been  produced  by  a  joint  team 
from  the CEPII1  and  the OFCE2 ,  with the help of the MIMOSA  macroeconomic  model 
of  the  world  economy,  which  these  two  organisations  have  developed  together. 
The  results  of  their  work  were  presented  for  the  first  time  in  May  1989  to  a 
meeting  at the French  S~nat  organ~sed by  the  D~l~gation pour  la Planification. 
Following  the  kind  invitation  of  Senator  Bernard  Barbier,  Chairman  of  the 
delegation,  this  meeting  was  attended  by  members  of  the  Working  Group  on 
Macroeconomic  Research  of  the  European  Centre  for  Parliamentary  Research  and 
Documentation  (ECPRD).  Fourteen  parliamentary  assemblies  were  represented  at 
the  meeting  and,  as  a  service  to  Members  of  these  assemblies,  the  ECPRD  has 
decided  to  publish  a  summary  of  the  MIMOSA  forecast.  We  should  like  to 
express  our appreciation to the CEPII  and  OFCE  for  making this possible. 
The  summary,  which  has  been  prepared  by  the  Statistical  Service  of  the 
European  Parliament,  does  not  purport  to  represent  the  views  of  the  European 
Parliament;  its  intention  is  to  contribute  to  the  debate  on  this  important 
topic. 
Any  comments  on this document  should be  addressed to: 
Mr  John Wittenberg 
Head  of the Statistical Service 
European  Parliament 
L-2929  Luxembourg. 
Tel:  ( 352)  4300-244  7; 
FAX:  (352)  434071 
1  Centre  d'Etudes  Prospectives  et  d'Informations  Internationales,  9  rue 
Georges-Pitard,  75015  Paris.  T~l:  48  42  64  69 
2  Observatoire  Fran9ais  des  Conjonctures  Economiques,  69  Quai  d'Orsay, 
75007  Paris.  T~l:  45  55  95  12 
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25 1.  THE  FORECAST  SUMMARIZED  IN  THREE  TABLES 
Table  1 
World  growth 
I  Growth  in GOP  I  73-79  79-87  88  89  90  91  92  93  Average! 
I (average rate in  %}  I  88-93  I 
------ ~"--~-------
i 
I  I  I  I 
!Germany  I  2.3  1.4  3.5  3.1  2.5  I  1.9  2.3  I  2.3  2.5 
I  I  I  I  I 
!France  I  2.8  1.7  3.4  2.6  2.1  I  2.8  2.5  I  2.0  2.4 
I  I  I  I 
!Italy  I  2.6  2.2  3.8  3.6  2.9  I  3.7  2.9  I  3.1  3.3 
I  I  I  I 
junited Kingdom  I  1.6  1.8  4.2  2.5  2.1  I  2.7  2.7  I  2.5  2.5 
I  I  I  I 
!Rest of  EC  I  2.5  1.6  3.3  2.6  2.5  I  2.7  2.9  I  3.2  2.8 
I  I  I  I 
jEC  total  I  2.9  1.7  3.6  2.9  2.4  I  2.7  2.6  I  2.6  2.7 
I  I  I  I 
jRest of Europe  I  1.9  2.2  2.7  2.2  2.3  I  2.8  3.1  I  3.6  2.8 
I  I  I  I 
junited States  I  2.4  2.5  3.9  2.6  2.2  I  2.4  1.9  I  1.8  2.2 
I  I  I  I 
!Japan  I  3.6  3.9  5.7  4.7  3.8  I  4.2  4.4  I  5.6  4.5 
I  I  I  I 
jRest of  OECD  I  3.6  2.9  3.8  2.9  3.0  I  3.0  2.9  I  3.0  3.0 
I  I  I  I 
jOECD  total  I  3.1  2.5  4.1  3.0  2.6  I  2.9  2.8  I  3.0  2.9 
I  I  I  I 
!Latin America  I  4.9  1.8  0.7  2.0  3.5  I  4.0  5.0  I  6.0  4.1 
I  I  I  I 
!Middle East/Maghreb!  5.7  0.7  1.5  6.0  5.0  110.0  9.7  111.2  8.3 
I  I  I  I 
jAfrican LDCs  I  3.0  0.4  3.0  4.0  5.0  I  5.0  5.0  I  5.0  4.8 
I  I  I  I 
14  Asian  NICs  I  9.1  7.4  9.4  7.5  6.1  I  6.2  7.3  !  8.1  6.6 
I  I  I 
jRest  of  Asia,  I  I 
!Oceania  I  5.3  7.0  9.2  5.8  5.0  I  5.0  6.0  7.0  5.8 
I  I  I 
I  USSR,  Eastern bloc  I  2.9  1.5  1.1  1.3  1.5  I 1.7  1.9  2.2  1.7 
I  I  I 
jworld  I  3.6  2.5  4.2  3.2  3.1  I  3.5  3.6  3.9  3.5 
__l__ 
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Major i.rxfustrializa:l ccuntries:  nest significant results 
- 7  -Monetary vac.:L.:..JJles  arrl basic camodi.ties 
l  Excharqe rates 
I 
1  73-79  l  80-8'/  ea  I  a9  1  go  91  92  I  93  ! Average  I 
I  l  es-93  1 
--·-i--·---· ·-------·!-------·-+----+---·--t  ------t-----i 
\ nollar/rrark  2.  34  1  2.  69  l.  76  I  1.  as  l  1.  75  I  1.  60  1  1. ss  I  1. so i  1 
jnollar/100 yen  2.65  1  2.45  :  1.2s i  1.3o  i  1.20  1  1.05  1  1.00  1  o.9sl  1 
!Yurk/tranc  1.98  I  3.3o  I  3.39  I  3.39  I  3.39  I  3.6s I  3.6s  I  3.6sl  I 
iHark/100 lira  3.3.:.  6.95  i  7.39  I  7.51  I  7.49  I  8.o1  I  8.o1  I  8.o11  1 
jP'Ji:ll"k/p::wrl  G.2~.  0.30  I  0.31  I  0.32  I  0.34  I  0.37  I  0.37  I  0.371  I 
~- I  ~-~r---~--~----+----+--~----~ 
!Stort-tenn  I 73-79  I 80-87  I  88  89  90  91  92  93  I Average 
I  interest rates  I  I  !  I  I  I  I  88-93 
~-----------.. -------+--- --------1-----·-·--+-·--··----t-·--+--+·--+--- I 
IGenteny  i  !  l  4.o  I  s.8  I  5.5  I  5.o  4.5  4.o I 
!France  I  !  I  7.5  I  8.5  I  8.o  I  1.0  6.0  I  6.o  1 
!Italy  !  ! 11.3  I 12.0  I 11.5  I 10.5  10.0  1  1o.o  1 
IUnitBcl Kingdom  1  i 1o.3  I 12.8  I 11.0  I  9.5  9.5  I  9.o  1 
lUnitOO states  !  7.6  9.9  1 9.5  1 a.5  8.5  I  8.5  1 
!Japan  1  3.s  4.3  1  4.o  1  3.5  3.5  I  3.5 I 
i-------+---+-·-------+--------+-------1----+----+---+---~ 
!Price of basic 
I  a::mrcdit  ies 
I 73-79  I 79-87  I  es  I  a9  I  90 
i  I  I  i 
91  92  93  I Averaga 
I  88-93 
-·---r------i ·------t-·----t ----+---+-----+--+-------1 
:oil  (Brent) 
\$;barrel 
I  real gravth rate* 
i 
i 
I  In:.:h.lS'"'....rial  rcr.v 
!materials in $: 
I  n::mi.nal gravth rate 
1  11.0  1  26.6  i 1s.o  1  11.s  I  17.5 
I  I  I  I  1 
I  22.a  1  - 3.6  1-2s.J  9.o !- 3.5 
8.6 
I 
I 
o  1  26.4 
I 
6.3  l-11.6 
J!:"eal  ~ich  rat.3~  1~ 3.0  l - 3.U  :  2C).~)  5.4  l-17.2 
I 
1  Agri  -tcx:rlstutts:  I  I 
!nominal  gravth rate  1  4.9  ! - 3.a  l  22.9  21.1  1  1o.o 
!real s~:u..r-JJ. rate*  !-- ::.3  l - 6.6  l 17.2  26.o  I  3.o 
. ___  L _____  L ___  L  _______  L_____  __  l 
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19.o  1  22.o  I  2s.o  I 
I  I  I 
4.6  I  9.7  I  8.7  I 
I  I  I 
I  I  I 
I  I  I  I 
I  - 2.2  1  11.9  I  - I 
i - a.5  1  2.o  !- 4.4  1 
I  I  l  I 
I  I  I  I 
!  - I - o.8 I  - I 
1 - 6.4  1 - 6.o  1- 4.4  1 
16.4 
5.6 
0.6 
-4.9 
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1.8 2.  THE  FORECAST  IN  BRIEF 
1988  was  a  particularly  successful  year  throughout  the 
industrialized world:  growth  was  substantial,  inflation rose  only 
slightly  and  current  payment  imbalances  were  reduced.  Is  the 
improvement  only  temporary  or  does  it mark  the  beginning  of  a  new 
period of  growth?  This  question  is central to any  forecast of the 
medium-term  development  of the world  economy. 
Before the  surprising and  welcome  changes  of  last year,  it in fact 
seemed  certain  that  world  growth  would  continue  along  the  path 
embarked  upon  during the years  following  the oil price shocks,  and 
this  mediocre  performance  indeed  seemed  threatened  in its turn  by 
the  exceptionally  large  balance  of  payment  imbalances  between  the 
industrialized  countries.  The  developments  over  the  last  few 
quarters  call  for  a  re-examination  of  the  medium-term  prospects. 
They  have  shown  that  expansion  is possible,  and  can  occur  without 
warning,  and  suggest  that  we  should  undertake  a  review  of  the 
possible  factors  standing in its way.  This  projection is based on 
such  an  approach. 
The  results may  seen  surprisingly pessimistic:  after slowing  down 
during  1989-90,  the rate of  growth  in the  OECD  countries will rise 
to  approximately  3%  per  year  by  1993,  which  is significantly  lower 
than  the  1988  performance  (4.1%).  Growth  will  be  unevenly 
distributed  among  the  United  States  ( 2 • 2%  per  annum  during  1988-
93),  the  EC  (2.7%)  and  Japan  (4.5%).  The  trend will,  however,  be 
less  disappointing  for  the  developing  countries  in  Latin  America 
and  Africa,  which  will  gradually  get  back  on  the  road  to  growth, 
while  Asia  as  a  whole  will  experience particularly buoyant  growth. 
Inflation  rates  will  vary  greatly:  low  in  Japan,  Germany  and 
France  (1.5%,  1.1%  and  2.6%  respectively at the end of the forecast 
period)  but  appreciably  higher  in  the  United  States  (5.4%). 
Despite  a  nominal  depreciation  in  the  dollar  and  the  slowdown  in 
American  growth,  the  imbalances  will  persist;  the  United  States 
- 9  -current  payment  deficit  will  reach  3.2%  of  GOP  by  the  end  of  the 
period,  while Japan  and  Germany will maintain their surpluses.  The 
differences  within  Europe  will  become  more  accentuated  as 
unemployment  continues  to  increase  in  France,  remains  stable  in 
Italy,  falls  steadily to  5.2%  by  the  end  of  the period  in  Germany 
and  remains well  below the  1987  level  in the United  Kingdom. 
This  gloomy  outlook  is  not  the  result  of  an  initially pessimistic 
assessment  of  growth  factors  nor  of  some  inevitable  progression 
which will not  permit continued expansion.  It is rather  imposed  by 
the  various  constraints,  whether  objective  or  chosen,  which  limit 
the  free  scope  of  the  major  industrialized  countries  and  by  the 
imbalances carried over  from  the beginning of the  1980s. 
- 10  -3.  GROWTH  AND  INFLATION  IN  THE  WORLD  ECO:trv"~ 
3.1.  Introduction 
The determination of the economic  authorities to curb  inflation is, 
in  the  short  term,  the  principal  obstacle  to  continued  growth. 
While the average rise in the rate of price increases was  slight in 
1988,  the first months  of  1989  have  seen renewed pressure on prices 
in  almost  all countries.  This  general  acceleration  is the  result 
of  both  universal  factors  and  factors  specific  to  certain 
countries.  The  most  important  among  the  former  is growing pressure 
on  the  markets  in  goods;  rates  of  utilization  of  industrial 
production  capacity  everywhere  are  reaching  their  highest  levels 
ever.  The  combined effects of an explosion in agricultural prices, 
a  rise in the price of  industrial  raw materials  and  an  increase in 
oil prices  are  fuelling  inflation  on  the  commodities  market.  The 
factors of the second type fall into two  very different categories, 
one  structural  and  the  other  conditioned  by  short-term  economic 
trends:  firstly,  renewed  pressure  on  the  labour  market  in  the 
United states and the United Kingdom  and,  secondly,  the increase in 
indirect taxation in Germany  and  Japan. 
Monetary  policies  reacted  promptly  to this  pressure  in the  summer 
of  1988  with  increases  in  short-term  interest  rates.  The  desired 
slowdown  is already well  under  way  in the United Kingdom  and  should 
make  itself felt in the United States over the next  few  months.  In 
continental  Europe,  where  the  restraining  measures  have  been  less 
severe,  it is  likely  to  be  more  gradual.  It  should  nevertheless 
occur,  and  the  projection  shows  a  general  decline  in  the  growth 
rate in the industrialized countries in 1989  and  1990  (Table 1). 
Will  this  slowdown  be  enough  to  curb  the  inflationary  pressure? 
There  is  reason to believe that it will  have  the  desired effect on 
the  prices  of  industrial  raw  materials,  which  tend  to  mirror  the 
trend in demand.  The price of oil,  which  has  recently undergone  an 
increase  primarily  because  of  short-term  economic  factors 
(exceptional consumption  and  reduced  supply in the OECD  countries), 
- 11  -should  also  stabilize  in real  terms  before  progressing slightly at 
the  beginning  of  the  next  decade.  On  the  other  hand,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  period  in  question  there  will  still  be 
inflationary  pressure  on  prices  of  agricultural  products, 
particularly those produced  in temperate  zones,  because of two  poor 
harvests  in  succession.  Overall,  however,  it  would  seem  that 
between  now  and  the  middle  of  the  next  decade  it will  be  possible 
to  eliminate  any  risk  of  serious  pressure  on  the  commodities 
markets  and,  in particular,  the risk of  a  third oil crisis. 
3.2.  United States 
The  outlook  is  less  certain  as  regards  the  domestic  causes  of 
inflation  in  the  major  industrialized  countries.  In  the  United 
States,  the level of unemployment  in 1988 was  5.4%,  which was  close 
to  the  level  generally  regarded  as  representing  full  employment. 
Continued expansion at the  same  rate as  in the last few  years would 
undoubtedly  lead to renewed  wage  inflation,  while the rate of price 
inflation  is  already  5%  per  annum.  The  Federal  Reserve  has  thus 
been  obliged  to  impose  a  rise  in  interest  rates  in order to  curb 
growth.  However,  one  consequence  of  this  restrictive  monetary 
policy  is  the  rise  in  the  value  of  the  dollar,  which  jeopardizes 
the external adjustment.  This  is why  some  budgetary correction has 
long  been  expected.  It  is  assumed  that  the  limited  provisions 
already  approved  or  adopted  for  1990  and  subsequent  years  will  be 
supplemented,  during  the  1991  and  1992  financial  years,  by  new 
measures  which  will  reduce  the  entire  public  sector  deficit  from 
1.8%  of  GOP  in  1988  to  0.5%  in  1993.  The  curbing  of  domestic 
demand will be  sufficient to bring unemployment  above  6%,  despite  a 
relaxation  of  monetary  policy made  possible by  the  knock-on  effect 
of  successive budgets. 
Adjustment  of  the  American  budget  is  likely  to  be  accompanied  by 
depreciation  in  the  dollar  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  it  would 
allow  the American  monetary  authorities to give  higher priority to 
reducing the external deficit without  having to fear that growth  in 
foreign  demand  and  rising  import  prices  will  lead  to  inflationary 
- 12  -overheating.  Secondly,  the consequent  fall  in short  and  long-term 
interest  rates  would  favour  downward  adjustment  of  the  dollar  on 
exchange markets.  After remaining  strong in 1989,  the dollar could 
thus  resume  a  downward  trend  in  1990,  falling  still  further  in 
1991.  Despite  the  easing  of  the  situation  on the market  in goods 
and  the  labour  market,  the  fall  in  the  exchange  rate  and  the rise 
in oil prices  would  then  cause  American  inflation to  level off at 
around  5.4%  per year in 1992  - 1993. 
3.3.  Japan 
Japan  is  not  faced  with  the  same  dilemmas  as  the  United  States. 
Although the  level of  unemployment  is still low  by  comparison  with 
the other  industrialized countries,  it is not  likely to provoke  an 
inflationary surge.  The  most  likely outlook for the medium-term is 
that  the Japanese  economy will maintain the  commendable  control  of 
prices  and  salaries  which  has  been  in  operation  since  the  end  of 
the  1970s.  The  main  question  concerns  the  impact  of the measures 
set  in  motion  in  recent  years  to  open  up  the  Japanese  market  and 
make  domestic  demand  the target  for  growth,  both  avowed  objectives 
of  medium-term  economic  policy.  The  prediction  is  that  the 
opening  up  of  the  Japanese  market  to  imports  will  continue  during 
the  years  1988-1993,  although  at  a  slower  rate  than  during  the 
period  1985-1988.  Despit.e  this  major  transformation,  which  will 
bring about  a  profound change  in the structure of  imports,  it is by 
no  means  certain  that  the  retargeting  of  growth  towards  domestic 
demand  will  continue.  Firstly,  there is likely to be  a  high  level 
of  demand  for  Japanese  exports  from  the  countries  of  Asia  and, 
secondly,  Japanese  companies,  which  had  quickly  adjusted  to  the 
rise in the yen  and which enjoy favourable production costs,  should 
be  in  a  position to maintain,  or even  extend slightly,  their share 
of  the  market.  Instead  of  growth  centred  on  domestic  demand,  the 
likely  scenario  is therefore  a  situation of  balanced  expansion  in 
which the contribution of the foreign balance will be  almost  zero. 
- 13  -3.4.  The  European  Community 
Without  the  lead  given  by  America 
competition  from  Japan  and  the  Asian 
and 
NICs 
with  ever  greater 
on  foreign  markets, 
Europe  will  have  to  look  to  its  own  devices  to achieve  expansion. 
But  while  it is  not  subject  as  a  whole  to  any  balance of  payments 
constraints  or,  with  the  exception  of  the  United  Kingdom,  any 
serious  threat  of  inflation,  the  interplay  of  constraints  on 
individual  European  countries  may  stand  in  the  way  of  continued 
growth.  Germany,  which exerts crucial influence on European market 
conditions  in its role as  collective guarantor  of price stability, 
no  longer  needs  rapid  growth  in order to make  its way  towards  full 
employment  in the medium  term.  It could thus get  by with an  annual 
growth  rate  of  around  2. 5%  during  the  period  1989-1993.  After 
several  years  of  expansion,  the United  Kingdom  is again  faced  with 
its  macro-economic  dilemma  of  the  1970s,  and  after  combating 
inflation at the expense  of  the  foreign  balance,  the  government  is 
likely  to  have  to  combat  the  external  deficit  at  the  expense  of 
growth.  France's  objectives  are  to  maintain  the  foreign  balance, 
reduce the public sector deficit and bring inflation into line with 
the best European performance,  and it has little room  for manoeuvre 
all the  time the  foreign  trade results  are  not  strong.  Italy will 
not  be  able  to  achieve  a  higher  rate  of  growth  than  its partners 
unless it is prepared to accept  an  above-average  level of inflation 
and  a  particularly  high  public  sector  debt.  In  all,  there  is 
little  reason  to  suppose  that  economic  policies  will  provide  any 
motivation  for  European  growth  in  the  medium-term  and  it is  more 
likely that  the  spontaneous  effects of  interdependence will  result 
in  a  level  of  performance  similar to that  at the  beginning of  the 
1980s. 
3.5.  The  developing countries  and the East  European countries 
While  the  above  analyses  indicate continuity in relation to trends 
prior to  1988,  the  same  is  not  true  for  regions  outside the  OECD. 
There  are  a  number  of  reasons  for  supposing  that  the  developing 
countries will experience faster growth  in the coming years than in 
- 14  -the first half of the decade.  In Asia,  the rate of  increase of  GOP 
should  remain  high  after  a  temporary  slowdown.  The  NICs  are  able 
to  take  advantage  of  the  fall  in  the  dollar  to  increase  their 
share  of  the  market,  and  the  continued  appreciation  of  the  Korean 
won  and  the  Taiwanese  dollar  against  the  us  dollar  do  not  seem 
likely to  threaten  the  export  performances  of  the  'four  dragons'. 
The  other  countries  in  the  region,  particularly  China  and  India, 
should  also  experience  rapid  growth,  with  a  cyclical  low  point  of 
around  5%  per  year.  Asia  as  a  whole  will  thus  be  caught  up  in  a 
dynamic  process  of  growth  and  interlinked  trade.  One  new 
development  is  that  Latin  America  and  Africa  may  also  see  an 
increase  in  real  income  as  a  result  of  improvement  in their terms 
of  trade  and  measures  to  reduce  the  foreign  debt  burden.  Lastly, 
the  performance  of  the  economies  of  Eastern  Europe  and  the  Soviet 
Union  will  remain  mediocre  on  average.  Perestroika  is  not 
expected to produce  immediate results. 
- 15  -.( 
4.  TBB  FOTORB  OF  I:RTERNATI:ORAL  PAYMBRT  DIBALARCES 
The  current  account  imbalances  between  the  major  industrialized 
countries  are  generally  regarded  as  a  threat  to  world  growth. 
Without  any  severe  restraint  imposing  foreign  balance  equilibrium 
on all countries,  it would  seem dangerous to accept  for the medium-
term  the  maintenance  of  surpluses  or deficits  which  would  lead  to 
the  continuing  growth,  as  a  proportion  of  GOP,  of  excessively 
positive or excessively negative net foreign positions. 
This  forecast  takes  account  of  the  two  factors  which  might  be 
expected  to  reduce  the  imbalances  - a  fall  in  the  dollar  and  a 
slowdown  in  American  growth.  The  surpluses/deficits  will, 
however,  persist.  At  the  end  of  the  forecast  period,  the  United 
States has  a  deficit of  220  000 million dollars,  Japan  a  surplus of 
168  000  million  and  Germany  a  surplus of  56  000  million  (Table 4). 
As  a  proportion of  each country's  GOP,  the  surplus or deficit will 
remain  near  the  1988  level  in  the  case  of  the  United  States  and 
Japan and fall slightly in the case of Germany. 
Table  4 
Current account balances 
(thousand million dollars) 
I  1982  I  1987  I  1988  1993 
United States  8.9  -154.4  -135.5  -218.5 
Japan  7.0  87.9  79.2  167.6 
Germany  5.1  45.2  48.6  56.4 
All  OECO  - 32.8  - 46.1  - 55.7  -117.6 
4  Asian  NICs  2.8  29.9  30.2  108.0 
Middle East/Maghreb  8.7  0.5  - 27.2  8.7 
Latin America  - 42.6  - 14.5  9.5  - 27.5 
World  - 62.0  - 38.1  - 77.6  - 96.5 
- 17  -There  are  two  reasons  for this stability.  The  first  is the burden 
of  the United  States'  foreign  debt  and,  conversely,  the  investment 
income  accruing  from  the  accumulation  of  foreign  assets  by  Japan 
and  Germany. 
The  United  States'  capital  balance,  which  was  still in  surplus  in 
1988  is  thus  likely  to  deteriorate  by  1  percentage  point  of  GOP 
during the period covered by this forecast. 
The  second  reason  relates  to  the  limited  effects  of  movements  in 
nominal  exchange  rates  in  the  context  of  pronounced  inflation 
differentials.  Between  1988  and  1993,  the  yen  will  appreciate  by 
35%  in relation to the  dollar,  its exchange  rate  falling  from  128 
to 95  yen per dollar.  OVer the same period,  however,  the inflation 
differential  measured  by  the  GOP  price  index  will  reach  20%. 
Taking  account  of  the  high  productivity  gains  in  the  Japanese 
manufacturing  industry  and  the  efforts  made  by  producers  with 
regard  to  profit  margins  in  order  to  retain  their  share  of  the 
market,  the  export  prices  in  dollars  of  Japanese  industrial 
products will  increase at  a  slower  rate than American  prices.  The 
depreciation  of  the dollar,  which  permitted  a  spectacular  recovery 
in  American  exports  in  1987-88,  has  ceased  to  be  effective  as  a 
weapon.  If  applied  suddenly  it  would  allow  for  a  recovery  in 
foreign  trade,  but  the  combined  effects  of  an  increase  in  exports 
and  a  rise,  however  small,  in  import  prices  would  be  enough  to 
bring  the  American  inflation  rate  up  to  a  level  which  undermines 
the  credibility  of  the  anti-inflation policy.  There  is therefore 
little chance of this  happening during the period  under  review.  A 
progressive  slide  in  the  dollar,  on  the  other  hand,  will  simply 
offset  the  effects  of  price  increases,  assist  Japanese 
disinflation and  fuel American inflation. 
It is thus clear that the substantial movements  in nominal  exchange 
rates  forecast  by  this  projection will  not  be  sufficient  to  bring 
about  any  major  shift  in  balance.  The  United  States'  share  of 
export  markets  in manufactured  products  (measured  by  the  ratio of 
exports  to export  demand)  will  continue  to  grow  in  volume  in  1989 
but  will  decline  thereafter,  while  Japan  will  regain  some  of  the 
ground  lost  sine~  1984  and  the  four  Asian  NICs  will  continue  to 
- 18  -progress.  The  value  of  their  surplus  will  increase  constantly, 
reaching  half  the  level  of  the  Japanese  surplus  by the  end  of  the 
period. 
- 19  -5.  THE  SEARCH  FOR  CONVERGENCE  Ilf EUROPE 
The  construction  of  the  single  European  market  and  the  often 
expressed  desire  to  implement  a  common  macroeconomic  policy  in 
Europe,  either  through  the  coordination  of  budgetary  policies  or 
via the  slow  path  towards  a  common  currency,  mean  that particular 
attention  must  be  given  to  the  convergence  of  macroeconomic 
performances  in this  region.  As  far  as  Europe  is concerned,  this 
period  will  probably  be  influenced  by  the  prospect  of  1992,  both 
because  of  the  economic  harmonization  measures  which  it  will 
require  and  on  account  of  the  changes  which  it may  produce  in the 
behaviour  of  economic  actors.  We  have  been  fairly  cautious  here; 
apart  from  tax  measures  which  have  already  been  announced  or  are 
certainly  to  be  expected,  we  have  taken  the  view  that  the 
uncertainties  regarding  tax  harmonization  are  too  great  to  be 
included here. 
In  establishing  our  working  hypothesis,  we  have  taken  account  of 
views  expressed in the FRG,  according to which the current exchange 
rate  policy  is  too  free  of  constraints  and  is  partly  responsible 
for  the  present  serge  in  inflation.  We  have  thus  assumed  that, 
when  the dollar falls  sharply at the beginning  of  1991,  the German 
mark  and  associated  currencies  will  appreciate  by  7%  against  the 
franc  and  the  lira.  Coinciding  with  the  fall  in the dollar,  this 
shift  in  parity  will  have  little  impact  on  inflation  in  these 
countries.  Because  of  the  British  foreign  debt,  the  pound 
sterling,  which  is currently  supported  by  high  interest  rates,  is 
likely to  fall  sharply  during  the  period  under  consideration.  We 
have  estimated  that  this  will  occur  at  the  end  of  1990,  after 
which,  having  levelled off  at  2.8  marks,  it will  prepare to enter 
the EMS. 
In  the  short  term,  interest  rates  will  remain  high,  directed 
towards  combating  inflation  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  FRG  and 
constrained  in France  and  Italy by  the  need  to maintain  the parity 
against  the  mark.  After  1991,  however,  the  realignment  and 
subsequent  convergence  of  monetary  policies  will  allow  real 
- 21  -interest  rates  to  be  more  closely  harmonized  at  a  relatively  low 
level:  2.9%  in  the  !!'RG  as  compared  with  3.3%  at  present,  3.4%  in 
France,  as  compared  with  4.6%,  5.3%  in  the  UK  as  compared  with  7% 
and  2.8%  in Italy as  compared with  5.4%. 
There is little evidence of convergence  when it comes  to the public 
sector deficits.  While  France will achieve its goal of progressive 
reduction  of  the deficit,  the  FRG  will  retain  a  deficit of  around 
2%  of  GDP  as  a  result of the tax reform and  low growth.  The  United 
Kingdom will retain  a  surplus  for  a  long  time to  come,  while Italy 
will have  a  high deficit of over  10%  of  GDP  (in 1970  lire).  In the 
European  countries  as  a  whole,  policy  will  be  aimed  primarily  at 
curbing  public  spending,  with,  where  possible,  tax  reduction 
programmes,  particularly in the United  Kingdom,  France  and the FRG. 
Budgetary policy is thus  not  likely to support growth. 
The  inflationary  surge of  1989  is not  likely to last.  Europe will 
benefit  after  1990  from  the  fall  in  the  dollar,  which will partly 
offset  the  effects  of  the  rise  in  oil  prices,  and  will  become  a 
region  of  low  inflation.  At  the  end  of  the  period  under 
consideration,  inflation rates  will  range  from  1.1%  in  the  FRG  to 
2.8%  in the  United  Kingdom,  with  France,  at  2.6%,  approaching  the 
German  model.  Italy  will,  however,  retain  a  higher  rate  ( 7%  in 
1993). 
But  Europe  will  also  be  a  region  of  moderate  growth,  the  average 
figures  for  the  period  as  a  whole  being  2.5%  for  the  FRG,  France 
and  the  United  Kingdom  and  3.3%  for  Italy.  In  the  EC  as  a  whole 
growth  will  fall  off  between  1988  ( 3.  6%)  and  1990  ( 2. 4%)  as  a 
result of various national anti-inflation policies and the  slowdown 
in the  world  economy,  before settling at  a  plateau of  2.6%  between 
1991  and  1993.  Domestic  demand  will  undoubtedly  grow  more  quickly 
(3%  in  the  FRG  for  example),  but  the  external  balance will  make  a 
negative  contribution  to  growth;  exports  will  rise  more  rapidly 
than  GDP  but  less  rapidly  than  imports.  European  countries  will 
tend to lose  some  of  their share of export markets  and suffer from 
excessive  import  penetration.  This  is  the  result  of  competition 
from  Japan  and the  'four dragons'. 
- 22  -The  rate of  increase  in per capita productivity will  remain  fairly 
high  in  Italy  (2.7%)  but  will  be  more  mediocre  in the other three 
major countries  (approximately  1.7%  per year).  By  comparison,  real 
wages will increase only slightly in France  (1%)  and the FRG  (1.7%) 
and  more  in  Italy  (2.6%)  and  the  United  Kingdom  (3.7%).  There  is 
thus  an  inverse  imbalance  between  France,  where  the  situation  of 
industry is continuing to improve,  and the United Kingdom,  where it 
is deteriorating. 
Employment  is progressing at a  fairly uniform rate,  around  0.6%  per 
annum,  but,  because of  pronounced  differences  in the  growth of  the 
labour  force  (0.1%  in  the  FRG,  0.4%  in  Italy,  0.6%  in the  United 
Kingdom  and  0.  7%  in  France),  there  are  marked  disparities  in  the 
development of unemployment  rates.  The  FRG,  which is also pursuing 
an  active  policy  of  reducing  hours  of  work,  will  bring  its 
unemployment  rate  down  to  5%  at  the  end  of  the  period,  which 
represents  almost  full  employment.  In  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
present high rate of growth will initially bring unemployment  below 
7%  but  the  curbing  of  growth  will bring it up  again at the end  of 
the period.  In Italy there will be  a  continuous but  slow reduction 
in the  initially high  level of  unemployment,  and  in France it will 
start  to  rise  slowly.  unemployment  will  thus  become  a  Franco-
Italian  problem.  on  the  other  hand,  the  pressure  on  production 
capacity,  which  is particularly acute at the  moment,  will ease off 
in all the European countries as  a  result of the current investment 
efforts and the  slowdown of industrial growth. 
While  Italy  and  France  will  see  little  change  in  their  foreign 
deficit,  the  United  Kingdom  will  lose  its  energy  surplus  and  its 
situation will deteriorate while the  FRG  will maintain  a  relatively 
stable surplus in relation to its GOP. 
This  feeble  growth  in Europe  might  lead one to suppose  that global 
re-expansion  would  be  welcome.  However,  such  re-expansion  is  not 
wanted  in  the  FRG,  which  has  an  external  surplus  and  prefers  to 
deal  with  unemployment  by  reducing  hours  of  work;  it is  scarcely 
possible  in  France,  which  is  hampered  by  the  external  constraint 
- 23  -and  does  not  wish  to  devaluate,  or  to  produce  adverse  effects  on 
its public  sector balance,  or to  lose  any  competitive  advantage  by 
allowing  wage  increases;  it  is  already  underway  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  thanks  to  a  sharp  fall  in  the  exchange  rate  and  the  drop 
in  the  savings  ratio,  but  it is  on  the point of reverting because 
of  the  unacceptable  effects  on  inflation  and  the  foreign  deficit; 
and,  lastly,  it  is  limited  in  Italy  by  the  constraints  of  the 
public sector and  foreign balances. 
Examination  of  each  country  in  turn  reveals  the  difficulties 
standing  in  the  way  of  the  necessary  coordination. of  economic 
policies.  There  is in all  cases  a  severe  constraint which  limits 
growth.  Europe  does  not  (yet?)  enjoy  the  advantages  of  synergy 
brought  about by transfers of capital and  labour. 
- 24  -6.  THB  UNCERTAINTIES  OF  TOMORROW 
The  scenario  described  in  this  forecast  is  consistent  within 
itself.  However,  some  mention must  be  made  of possible dangers  and 
of possible hopes  for  a  more  encouraging  future. 
Attention has  been drawn  in various places to the possible risks of 
loss  of  control.  The  main  dangers  are  those  of  an  inflationary 
surge  in  the  United  States  and  continuing  current  account 
imbalances.  If  the  American  economy  were  to  go  off  course  in the 
short  or  medium  term,  there  would  probably  be  a  reaction  from  the 
Federal  Reserve,  as  pointed  out  above,  and  a  recession  could 
result.  This  is  a  recognized  problem  and  no  further  explanation is 
necessary.  However,  less is known  about the dangers represented by 
a  continuing  situation  of  international  imbalances.  No  one  can 
define the  upper  limit  for the  US  foreign  debt  - recent experience 
has  shown  that  limits  which  were  previously  considered  absolute 
have  been  transgressed  without  any  consequent  damage.  Our 
projection does  not  lead up,  at the end of the five year period,  to 
any  stabilization of  foreign  assets/liabilities as  a  proportion of 
each country's  GOP.  Reactions  to  a  continuing  foreign deficit  may 
come  from  both the debtor  and the creditor and there are reasons to 
fear  that  failure  to  reduce  the  United  States  trade  deficit  may 
ultimately push trade disagreements too far. 
There  is also the possibility that  favourable  surprises  may  occur, 
particularly for Europe.  The  approach adopted here concentrates on 
macro-economic  chains  of  events  and  the  interplay of  the  policies 
of the different countries.  We  do  not  consider that there will be 
any  major  changes  in  this  area  between  now  and  1993.  Monetary 
union  is still a  relatively distant prospect  and  its institutional 
make-up  is uncertain. 
to  whether  greater 
Similarly,  there  is as  yet  no  indication as 
coordination  of  macro-economic  policies  in 
Europe is likely to mean  expansion or restraint.  During the coming 
years,  the prospect of greater competition within the Single Market 
could  certainly  stimulate  investment  and  rationalization  and  this 
new  boost  to  supply  could result  in better European  performance  on 
- 25  -foreign  markets.  However,  given  the  information  available  at 
present,  these  are mere  hopes  rather than objective data which  may 
be  included in a  forecast. 
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